A Brief History of Changing Attitudes: 150 Years of Business and Social Reform in Canada, 1867 - 2017

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Rough draft for purposes of discussion at AFEC conference June 14-16, 2017. Please do not cite without permission.

Abstract

This paper explores the area of business participation in social policy reform since the end of the 19th century. Informed by Canadian National Policy development, I argue that business leaders' attitudes towards social welfare are diverse, non-unified and change over time and in different contexts. That is, business attitudes towards social policy are not especially idiosyncratic. They often mirror those in the broader community and within government. One of my main conclusions is that business leaders, generally, do not know what they think about social reform or which social policy instruments or social development strategies to pursue in order to secure the community compliance necessary for continued expansion associated with global-market capitalism. This uncertainty is especially prevalent during transitional periods when the contradictions of new economic models or national policies creates a new array of social challenges for corporate elites. However, periods of corporate uncertainty also create important openings for a variety of grassroots and community-based organizations to move alternative development strategies onto public policy agendas and further upwards, into the state.

Introduction

Probably no other development in the past 150 years has affected the everyday lives of Canadians as much as the making and unmaking of the country's universal social welfare system. The uneven exposure and subordination of our daily lives to risks associated with changing patterns of unregulated national, international and global market-capitalism has been linked, over the years, to the negative attitudes of major business interests (Griffin-Cohen, 1988; Ursel, 1992; Little, 1998; Bezanson, 2006; Braedley and Luxton, 2010). Historically, the impact of corporate antipathy towards the country's evolving social safety-net can best be seen during periods of transition between National Policies where there were steep declines in living standards, wages stagnated, unemployment rolls swelled, poverty spread and inequality increased significantly for many Canadians (Struthers, 1981; Valverde, 1991; and, Vosko, 2006).

This view of business and social reform appears consistent, on the one hand, with an understanding of power that predominates within the social policy literature and that is rooted in the control of resources, especially the control of wealth, and the institutional position and class awareness necessary to influence government decisions over who gets what, that is to say, how resources are shared (Fox-Piven, 2011). Variations of this view have been developed by a range of social theorists of corporate power, as when Jamie Brownlee says that business leaders are explicitly class conscious and are systematic in the pursuit of their own interests – corporate elites are a *class of itself* and a *class for itself* (Brownlee, 2005). Where Wendy Larner and Maria Butler conclude that the emergence of new corporate-dominated governing techniques have normalized market rule and neo-liberalized the life-world (Larner and Butler, 2005). And Jamie Peck, who points to the proliferation of resource-weakened communities that do not have the strategic nimbleness to resist the downward global pressures of "roiling neo-liberalization" – the agility of supranational corporate power - on local social reforms (Peck, 2013).

On the other hand, this view of business and social reform appears inconsistent with the understanding of private sector power and political influence prevailing within the business social history literature, as when Alvin Finkel suggests that corporate elites are not a cohesive force able to act in a unified manner to advance their policy preferences and that business leaders have the tendency to adapt in an orderly way and to support community-driven social reform processes (Finkel, 1979). In this regard, James Struthers, Michael Bliss, Douglas Owram and J.L. Granatstein, among others, propose that business leaders often act in cooperation with a range of other community actors such as academics, bureaucrats, faith-based and non-profit groups. They also claim that when corporate elites change their attitudes towards social welfare it is because of an "ethos of community stewardship". That is, business leaders appear willing to sacrifice their own short-term goals for the long-term interests of the broader community and as necessary steps to ensuring the conditions for future economic expansion (Struthers, 1981; Granatstein, 1982; Owram, 1986; Bliss, 1987).

Clearly, one variant or another of the widely held thesis that business influence over the evolution of social welfare in Canada is based on the control of wealth, institutional position and class status explains a good deal of our experience since Confederation. But it does not explain all of our experience. There are many instances since Confederation and across the country at municipal, provincial, territorial and federal levels of government where business leaders have changed their attitudes towards social policy (Hudson and Close, 2012). There have been periods of social policy renewal and welfare state expansion where some business leaders, who had previously rejected state income supports and regulatory mechanisms, changed their positions and became, as an example, supporters of living wage policies, unemployment insurance benefits and poverty reduction initiatives (Finkel, 1979; Struthers, 1981; Bliss, 1987, Hudson, 2013). In order to move this debate forward and to help clarify our present understanding of business and social reform, I propose bringing the social policy and business social history literatures together and centering an investigation of business and social reform on competing strategies and social forces and the role of the state. I ask the question: what can business' changing attitudes towards social reform tell us about the power of other social forces, including the role of the state, in the development of Canada's welfare state between 1867 and 2017? By expanding the focus from business-government relations to include other social / community forces in the context of competing strategies, specifically the use of disruptive or interdependent power – the kind of moral power that derives from people occupying many roles in many social relations, such as mother, worker, and volunteer - against the backdrop of a crisis of social reproduction (Fox-Piven, 2011: 206-226), this study reveals three things: 1) community actors do not have to be unified or offer coherent alternatives to corporate social agendas for resistance to be successful; 2) moral power can translate into meaningful political power; and, 3) for many communities small victories are vital. Small victories matter if for no other reason than to reopen doors or to hold them open while non-market social forces push their demands upwards and deeper into the state.

In this paper, I first review some of the theoretical problems inherent to social policy and business social history models where the focus is on structural dimensions of business power and community social relations. Paying particular attention to neo-Gramscian frameworks, I argue that these approaches are deficient because they tend to limit their sights on abstract analysis and contend that, to move our understanding of business and social reform beyond the notion of corporate and, by extension, state immunity to non-business social forces, we need to know more about how social relations are actually playing out on the ground – we must get down to cases. I then examine the concept of wages with reference to social reproduction and the nature of disruptive power. Next, I briefly review the mixed ideological foundations of the Canadian welfare system. What follows is the core of this study: four snapshots of business' changing attitudes towards social reform. Following Michael Burowoy's extended case methodology, I use ethnographic and historical accounts supported by 163 interviews conducted within business, community and government sectors based in Calgary, Alberta and Toronto, Ontario to examine select cases of business, community and government relations across time and jurisdictions (Burawoy, 2009). Lastly, I will attempt to ground the discussion in competing strategies and social forces by comparing the capacity of diverse actors to influence the trajectory, form and content of the Canadian welfare state between 1867 and 1917.

Explaining Business Power and Social Reform: Two Literatures; Two Debates

Debate #1: Social Policy and Power Elite Theory

A corporate power-centred, or power elite, approach has influenced the work of many leading political economists seeking to explain the structural realignment, consolidation, and diffusion of business power across the Global North since the end of the 19th century. There are, however, significant cleavages amongst those who seek to theorize the impacts of corporate power on local communities. The divisions between them can be traced to distinct points of departure. For example, some begin their investigations with Antonio Gramsci's notion of business power as the drive for class dominance and social control based on the concept of a hegemonic bloc and explained in terms of sociologies of power (e.g., Carroll and Shaw, 2001; Carroll and Carson, 2003; Brownlee, 2013). Others start from Michel Foucault's notion of business power as driven by expert knowledge(s) and strategic practices based on the concept of governmentality and explained in terms of genealogies of power (e.g., Larner, 2005; Larner and Craig, 2005). Yet another group of scholars, some of whose thinking about business and social reform reflects the influence of Karl Polanyi, propose a *via media* or middle path between these two approaches that emphasizes a socially situated and instituted analysis of business power as the drive to embed society (social institutions) into economic relations (markets) based on the concept of mobility and explained in terms of the transversal (intersecting) interpenetration of waged and unwaged economies (production and social reproduction) (e.g., Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck and Theodore, 2013).

Each of these explanatory streams offers promising insights into various aspects of business power and contemporary social reform in the context of local social partnerships. For example, some scholarly uses of governmentality frameworks successfully move us beyond thinking almost exclusively in terms of state-centred relations by bringing non-state elements, such as patriarchal, gender, ethnic, cultural, social and ethical issues, into discussions of how corporate power is organized and exercised (Conway, 2004). Helpfully, Foucauldian analyses tends to stress that political power is not concentrated in business, but flows through diverse networks, groups and coalitions and is dispersed between a number of agents and social forces (Panelli and Larner, 2010). However, while communities in some of these accounts are often portrayed as possessing moral power, they do not seem to have any actual political power (Larner, 1997). In other words, we are left with the sense that business leaders have instrumentalized non-business actors. Thus, it is unclear if social reforms that break with the neo-liberal paradigm are a consequence of community resistance, co-option or complicity.

Similarly, some scholars, who represent their work as a middle-path between insufficiently reflexive orthodox political economy models and excessively fluid relativist approaches, provide us with important insights into how interlocutors mobilize a neo-liberal corporate agenda across cultures, societies, and variegated geographical spaces and places. Specifically, we learn that neo-liberal policy packages are “made-to-travel” in a dense network of supra-national institutions and extended downward into the local state by sub-national interlocutors in a manner that quickly overwhelms community organizations and anti-hegemonic groups (Peck and Theodore, 2015). Power relations at the global level, however, are not merely mapped onto local relations through such fast policy transfers but re-contextualized, reproduced and re-instituted through policy intermediaries and compliant sub-national bureaucratic fields (Peck, 2011; Peck, 2013). In this regard, local social partnerships are considered a deliberate strategy to mask integration of a global corporate agenda, thus, normalizing and extending neo-liberalism deep into the structures of society. In some of these accounts, communities appear to lack the institutional power necessary to slow or resist the pace of change or alter the trajectory of social reform. Community interests and resistance cannot be pushed upwards into the state because moral power does not translate into political power (Coulter, 2009). However, we gain limited insights into how community resistance has been so easily muted. That is, we are left wondering: how are local political structures such as community coalitions pushed into a secondary position or complicit roles?

Lastly, those who take the interplay between class hegemony and elite structures as their theoretical starting point tend to explain business power and social reform in terms of problematizing the influence that a neo-liberal corporate agenda has achieved among policymakers. This approach contains an implicit model of political processes that privileges elite social organization and stresses the downward pressures of national and transnational interlocking corporate networks on sub-national public policy making. From this perspective, business policy preferences are pressed on local bureaucrats and elected officials and civil society is gradually won over to a free-market rationale through social partnerships (Carroll, 2004; Carroll, 2010; Klassen and Carroll, 2011). Moreover, some suggest that the increased capacity of business leaders to control social policy making since the mid-1970s is the result of a systematically constructed hegemonic bloc which is underwritten by a network of policy groups, such as corporate think tanks, driven by a new form of business activism and led by a corporate vanguard (Carroll and Shaw, 2001; Carroll and Carson, 2003).

In this regard, William K. Carroll proposes that the super-rich form a small, cohesive inner circle, or corporate vanguard, at the top of a pyramid of transnational corporate power. According to Carroll, policy decision-making flows downward from this centre of corporate gravity to subordinate levels of organic intellectuals (managers, advisors and directors who act as agents of corporate elites), then further downstream to national, sub-national, and regional business organizations (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade) (Carroll and Carson, 2003). The vanguard plays a critical role in organizing elite consensus on policy issues or, as Carroll describes their function, forging symbiotic relationships among sectors and business leaders (Carroll, 2007).

Further to this, Carroll suggests that the distinctly 19th century old-boys' network approach to influencing policy making which rested on a closed system of social ties and an inward-looking, leisure class attitude has shifted towards a more open, meritocratic, out-ward looking global consciousness and pro-activist approach rooted in a corporate direct-interventionist attitude (Carroll, 2004). Jerome Klassen and William K. Carroll note that this shift in business activism is particularly evident in the rise of business participation in public-private partnerships, community coalitions and public consultations (Klassen and Carroll, 2011). Further to this, Stephen McBride suggests that the privatization of state economic functions and a significantly reduced role for the state in the social sphere has resulted in a colonization of the public sector by private business interests (McBride, 2005). That is, according to Heather Whiteside and Stephen McBride, a classical political economy has taken root in the structures of society at such depths that it is nearly impossible to dis-embed and is almost immune to community efforts to change its trajectory (McBride and Whiteside, 2011).

This explanatory model of business power and social reform has greatly advanced our understanding of the linkages between an intricate and extensive web of global structures of corporate power and the pathways through which supra-national power relations are pushed downward onto local relationships. However, from this perspective, policy decision-making appears unidirectional - flowing from business needs and interests to state action. We have the sense that social policy processes are unencumbered by non-business claims on the state where the community is conceived, largely, as victims of corporate power and influence. The problem in this model, however, is not counter-hegemonic powerlessness *per se*. Rather, it appears to be that the type of power that many communities possess - moral power – is insufficient to adequately challenge or resist a corporate hegemonic bloc. In other words, community groups lack the most important kind of power – institutional power led by a vanguard of social activists. In contrast to this high-level analysis of business' structural power where non-business actors are limited in their ability to influence social reform, other social theorists suggest that a range of diverse social forces, competing strategies and state interests have, to varying degrees, countered corporate social policy agendas and introduced new logics into the Canadian welfare state. Jane

Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin, for example, argue that, in the current transitional period, welfare programs and services have been transformed from the previous 'passive' social safety net into a ‘springboard’ for individual development. Labour market policies promote flexibility and lifelong learning and the role of the state is to enable economic growth and to promote social prosperity through investment in human capital, particularly through expanding education, employment and economic opportunities and promoting local partnerships among key stakeholders (Jenson and Saint Martin, 2006). Here, social reform focuses on children, early intervention and a predominant role for communities, especially third sector agencies, which appeals to the local level as the primary site where employment, educational and economic opportunities are fostered and represent a maximum return on social investments (Dobrowolsky, 2002).

The relationship between social inclusion and social cohesion is the primary concern of the 'active' post-industrial welfare system or social investment state logic (Levitas, 2005). That is, the overall state of social bonds / relationships (also known as social capital) has become central in social policy debates (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002). Jane Jenson and Susan D. Philips note that institutionalisation of social cohesion, in the context of shifting the focus of Canada's welfare regime from adults to children and communities, has transformed the content of social welfare (Jenson and Philips, 1996). In this regard, Jenson and Saint-Martin suggest that conflict over designing the new post-industrial citizenship regime has manifested in debates over the division of welfare responsibilities (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). Jenson has mapped this debate using the concept of a welfare diamond to depict struggles over the allocation of responsibilities among four possible sources: the state, market, family and community (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006).

Jenson is suggesting that new social investments are being driven by new ideas about individual and collective responsibilities that require extensive institutional adaptation (Jenson, 2003).

Rianne Mahon, likewise, focuses on issues of social inclusion / cohesion and extra-economic factors to highlight linkages between competing political strategies and broader social relations of power. However, Mahon's analysis of competing actors and social reform suggests a slightly different set of conclusions. Taking as her point of departure Karl Polanyi's sociological frame of reference that the market economy is an instituted process where the economy is conceived as a substantive process (a complex network of social relations, values, ideas and causality) and where livelihood (productive and social reproductive factors) are put at the centre of analysis, Mahon conceives the state both as a macro-actor and as a set of social relations – space of struggle (Polanyi, 1957; Mahon, 2008). A main concern for Mahon is explaining how various parts of society relate to the whole and especially how institutions derived from the particular combination of these parts in a unique place and time contributes to society's overall stability.

In this regard, Rianne Mahon and Laura Macdonald suggest that activation policies, which includes training, re-skilling and other forms of assistance to develop individual human capital, represent an inclusive liberal logic where the state recognizes that the social sphere is critical to the economic sphere and that the state should intervene to empower people but not to challenge economic globalization (Mahon and Macdonald, 2009). In contrast to the social investment explanatory model noted above, the inclusive liberalism model centres on the adult worker (with redesign of social insurance system to support this worker), lone parents (with supports such as child care to sustain work force attachment) and is concerned with intergenerational transmission of poverty. To this end, the state has a responsibility to intervene in early childhood education as a foundation for lifelong learning and to help parents to parent. However, there is little emphasis on children or women *per se* in the inclusive liberalism paradigm. Put otherwise, inclusive liberalism introduces measures to counter a low-wage economy that includes equal pay provisions, expanding the scope of unions, subsidizing childcare and providing training and reskilling supports (Mahon, 2013).

These social theorists, in contrast to those who emphasize business power derived from topdown economic structures that severely limit or co-opt community agency, imply that the story of business and social reform is more complex and that non-business social forces do impact business' attitudes toward social welfare. That is, business attitudes towards social reform change and are influenced by other social forces including the state. According to these social theorists, the way to discern the nature of business power and the extent of corporate influence on social reform is to investigate political struggles, competing strategies (and networks) and conflicting social visions (ideas, values, and norms) from the bottom-up. This will tell us something about the power of competing social forces, including business, and the nature of social policy renewal.

Debate #2: Business Social History and Adaptive Reform

There is a general consensus among business historians that the history of business and social reform in Canada is distinctive because the nature of social relations (business leaders are far less coherent, organized, and politically effective than in the United States, for example)[i] and the character of Canadian economic development (a diffuse, locally directed pattern of industrialization) does not allow us to make use of a linear model (Bliss, 1987; Finkel, 1979, 2006; Nerbas, 2013)). That is, the interconnectedness between Canadian enterprise, social welfare, and allied institutions such as education, health care, and the community and family is visible in more than one ideological form. However, business historians are divided when it comes to theorizing social reform. One the one hand, some argue that corporate elites tend to be adaptive to prevailing circumstances while, on the other hand, some argue that there are more complex factors underpinning business' changing attitudes.

Very briefly, the claim that the business community has the tendency to successfully adapt in an orderly way and to control social reform processes is argued most explicitly in Alvin Finkel's important study, *Business and Social Reform in the Thirties* (1979). Finkel's study of business and social policy renewal during the 1930s marks a period of a major change in the role of the Canadian state. At the beginning of WWI, the state was classically *laissez-faire* in its orientation. By the end of WWII, an interventionist state had firmly taken root. Finkel argues that business leaders not only changed their attitudes towards social reform and the state during the years between the major wars, but actively pursued universal social welfare benefits and state interventions. However, Finkel's account of change understates the importance of the forces of social protest initiated during the Depression by farmers, workers and academics as well as divisions within the business community (Williams, 1979).

Challenging this account of prescient adaptation are stories about a more complex set of factors underpinning business' change of attitudes towards social policy, including: the failure of policy alternatives within the business community and fundamental shifts in power away from business elites due, largely, to internal fragmentation, stiff resistance from within government, and a range of community forces organizing from below. This account is argued most explicitly in Don Nerbas' valuable contribution to this debate, *Dominion of Capital: The Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the Canadian Bourgeoisie, 1914-1947* (2013). While Nerbas tells a very compelling story about the power of big business' influence on the social state in central Canada, community resistance disappears into divisions among corporate elites over the form and content of social reform. We are also left to wonder about the role of the state in business' changing attitudes towards social reform (Forster, 2015).

While no attempt is made here to review the entire history of Canadian business and social reform or to engage the issue of elites developing a sense of being a class 'of and for itself', which would require a much deeper analysis and much closer attention to bourgeois organizational structures, this study does seek to analyze business' changing attitudes toward social reform within the wider social, cultural and economic world in which business leaders are situated. The snapshots presented below have been developed primarily as a way to begin to map out general patterns of change in the areas of wages and the organization of production and social reproduction as a response to community protest / disruptive power. In this sense, the cases were selected to emphasize those areas of community social relations of most concern to business leaders - conditions of work and the ability of workers to reproduce themselves.

Wages, Social Reproduction and the Nature of Disruptive Power

The theoretical starting point for this paper is the claim that the moral nature of community power may reinforce business preferences for social reform through co-option or complicity. My premise is that moral power is sufficient, under certain conditions, for some non-business social forces to resist corporate hegemony and to break with some market-driven (classical economic) social reforms. Consequently, the strategies some communities adopt that successfully slow the pace of change, alter the trajectory of reform or obstruct business demands for social reform merit attention. Put otherwise, we need to explain why business demands for social reform fail. Given that the following snapshots of business and social reform are viewed through the lens of community resistance and centre on struggles for living wages and improved conditions of work, a critical Marxist understanding of wages constitutes a basic component behind any counter-hegemonic strategy for fundamental social transformation. At the risk of over simplification, Marx's notion of wages, essentially, starts from processes of capital accumulation: 1) wages cannot rise, in a given situation, unless profits fall; and, 2) capitalism tends to respond to demands for increases in wages by substituting dead labour (machines) for workers. However, during periods of economic expansion (booms) when there are more jobs than workers, competition among capitalists for labour can cause wages to increase. In these moments, higher wages permit higher standards of living (e.g., labour participation in recreation, education, and entertainment). Nonetheless, in general, Marx contends that wages tend to sink to subsistence levels (Marx [1844] 2007: 69-79).

What is the point here? Marx is saying that the value of labour power - wages - contains two elements: physical and social. Wages must be sufficient to keep the worker alive but also to maintain a standard of living relative to conditions prevailing in the surrounding society. In other words, all workers want a fair share in the progress of general wealth. In this regard, Marx argues that the determination of wage levels (between workers' absolute physical and relative social needs) depends upon the "vicissitudes of the class struggle" (Marx [1932] 1993: 197-198). In the first instance, the wage problem is a reflection of the relationship between (paid) production and (unpaid) social reproduction where social reproduction refers to daily caring, child rearing and household maintenance responsibilities with the understanding that social reproduction and production are not separate spheres (Bezanson, 2006: 10-12). Rather, social reproduction and economic production are integrated processes that unfold twenty-four hours a day across the entire week and life of a human being (Luxton, 2009). In the second instance, the wage problem is a reflection of class struggle - disruptive power. Although moral and disruptive power are closely related and are often used interchangeably, they are not the same thing. Moral power, as suggested above, denotes a sense of fair share - an honest day's pay for an honest day's work - and is rooted in a community's material conditions. Though also rooted in objective and subjective material conditions, disruptive power, in a word, means rule-breaking. People break rules, especially the rules of institutional cooperation, as a way to challenge the formidable power that business and the political right command and which is designed to inhibit influence from below.[ii] Disruption is a strategy rooted in withdrawing cooperation in social relations. Strikes are an obvious example of disruptive power.

For our purposes, cooperative relations are understood as institutionalized, that is to say, social partnerships, cross-community coalitions or multi-stakeholder relations are, to a greater or lesser extent, rule-governed. However, because rules underpinning social partnerships are deeply intertwined within a matrix of social relations, rules can "become strategies of power by which some people try to make other people serve their will." (Marx, [1932], 1993: 218). In other words, "those who try to mobilize disruptive power must overcome the constraints typically imposed by their multiple relations with others…as when labour insurgents are constrained by family ties." (Fox-Piven, 2011:220). Moreover, rules have complex material, cultural, ethical, gendered, and religious dimensions. Nonetheless, the material activities of daily life may prompt some people and communities to recognize their interdependent (disruptive) power and are often helped to do so by various leaders within the community. Therefore, disruptive power suggests that power from below is there for the taking (216).

The Mixed-Ideological Nature of the Canadian Liberal Welfare State

Gosta Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology offers a useful frame of reference for a study of business and social reform. Taking an aggregate expenditure approach, EspingAndersen investigates rights-conferring aspects of welfare provision in advanced industrial democracies along four dimensions: decommodification, stratification, public versus private provisions, and defamilialization. Decommodification refers to the ability of workers to subsist independent of the labour market. Stratification refers to the degree that welfare policies reinforce differences between classes or create dual social protection systems. Private versus public provisions refers to the scale and scope of government legislated and delivered welfare benefits. And, defamilialization refers to the extent to which households and caring responsibilities are supported either by the state or by the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2023).[iii] On the basis of these dimensions, Esping-Andersen identifies three ideal-typical welfare regimes: Liberal, Christian Democrat (also known as Conservative-Corporatist) and Social Democratic. Canada is categorized as a liberal welfare state. Like most others within this regime (the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand), Canada has low levels of decommodification, defamilialization and public benefits, and high levels of social stratification (22).

Canada's liberal welfare regime entails three social goals: to redistribute income, to redress market failures, and to promote certain social values. To these ends, the country's social safety net consists of a range of programmes and services designed to provide for the economic and physical security of citizens, from income supports such as pensions, unemployment insurance, child benefits, housing subsidies and day care to a wide variety of education, training and health services. It also includes fiscal and regulatory measures aimed at mitigating the harsher aspects of unfettered global market-capitalism, such as: counter-cyclical budgeting, regional economic development programmes, agricultural price supports and minimum wage laws. The Canadian liberal welfare regime rests on the principles of means-testing and modest social benefits as a way to discourage 'welfare traps' (disincentives to work) and to minimize social spending where eligibility is usually decided along two axes: as a last resort or on the basis of previous earnings.[iv] For example, social insurance is an earnings-related contributory programme that provides modest levels of wage replacement for labour market absences due to worker illness, pregnancy, unemployment, disability and retirement. Social assistance, on the other hand, is a programme for poor people, which requires recipients to first spend-down their assets before benefit levels are determined. As a final course of action, used only when all else has failed, beneficiaries are often subject to intrusive state monitoring and behavioural surveillance as a means to reactivate labour market participation. Both aspects of the country's welfare regime are transfer-intensive and based on a negative income tax scheme. The idea is that, during prosperous times the worker pays taxes to the government and during difficult times the government pays taxes to the worker. Common examples include child care and working or earned income tax credits (Guest, 1997).

However, two caveats to Esping-Andersen's ideal-typical scheme must be more fully acknowledged: first, although the Canadian social policy regime is widely accepted as a liberal democratic welfare state, it does not fit easily within this classification; and, second, the scheme fails to consider gender, particularly women, in the context of broader social relations. With regards to the first caveat, Francis Castles argues convincingly that Canada's legacy of radical egalitarianism driven by new agrarian socialist forces emergent at the turn of the 20th century, the tendency of the Canadian federal Liberal and Conservative parties to vary quite markedly over time in their adherence to progressive causes and the strength and political power of provincial social democratic parties has produced a welfare state that is an admixture of social democracy, liberalism and conservatism (Castles, 1993: 93-128). In effect, Castles is suggesting that the history of Canadian social welfare is an ambivalent expression of Esping-Andersen's liberal democratic welfare scheme and would be more correctly classified in terms of a fourth *radical* *world* of welfare. In this study, I adopt Castle's understanding that the Canadian liberal welfare state is an expression of the intersection and cross-fertilization of multiple ideologies.

In terms of the second caveat, concerns of gender have pervaded and shaped debates about Canada's liberal welfare state across its history (Finkel, 2006). Consequently, business' changing attitudes towards the welfare state has important gender dimensions. That is, business interests both influence and are influenced by gender relations.[v] This raises the question, how 'womanfriendly' is business' attitude towards social reform? By this is meant, among other things: does business propose to support paid labour more than unpaid labour; does business ignore workers' care giving responsibilities; and, how does business' changing attitudes affect gender arrangements, such as the division of labour, the (family) wage system, and traditional notions of family and marriage? These concerns are especially relevant given that the welfare state has been central to making women's issues meaningful and worthy of attention in the public domain; legitimizing women's struggle for equality; increasing the capacity and reach of women's political power; and, for expanding the scope of participation in society for many of Canada's poorest and most vulnerable women (Brodie and Bakker, 2008; Brodie, 2010).

However, despite Esping-Andersen's efforts to incorporate women into his ideal-typical scheme (Esping-Andersen, 2009), as Julia S. O'Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver note, "he focused on women workers rather than on gender relations, and is interested in relations among states, markets and families because of the implications of care giving responsibilities for women's capacities to bear children and to enter paid employment, both significant for states' fiscal concerns, but not because of women's aspirations for equality."(O'Connor, Orloff, Shaver, 1999: 20). That is, without modifications, Esping-

Andersen's typology is problematic for the purposes of this study as it cannot explain changing social relations between women and men or, by extension, between women and families, communities, or business interests. This study addresses this oversight by drawing on the work of recent Canadian feminist[vi] and political economy scholars whose re-conceptualization of Esping-Andersen's model and whose research in the area of welfare state restructuring takes into account not only the division of labour between states and markets (the primary emphasis of Esping-Andersen's power resources model), but also explores the nexus between the institutions of the family, state, market, and community; how that nexus has been defined; and, how various actors have attempted to influence the responsibilities and power of these various institutions.[vii] This body of work emphasizes the historical specificity of women's struggles and the role of the state in structuring particular ideas and discourses about gender relations; namely, oppression and inequality but also constructed hierarchies related to race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class.

Four "Snapshots" of Business' Changing Attitudes towards Social Reform, 1867 - 2017

The following set of snapshots of business' changing attitudes towards social policy are presented in different political, economic, and social contexts across a founding and three pivotal transitional eras in Canadian business social history: 1) the Era of Consolidation (1867 – 1914) or the First National Policy period where business leaders established and consolidated Canada's position in North America; 2) the Era of Contradictions (1914 – 1940) where the contradictions of earlier economic expansion, such as unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion, created a range of challenges for business leaders and resulted in the search for a new political economy; 3) the Era of Consensus (1940 – 1975) where a Keynesian Revolution or Second National Policy period reshaped business, community, government relations for nearly four decades; and, lastly,

4) the Era of Knowledge and Information (1975-2017) where the ongoing transition to a postindustrial economy or Third National Policy has produced some of the greatest social inequalities since the 1930s.

A review of business social history informed by Canadian National Policy development offers several advantages; namely, this approach will draw our attention to competing social visions (relationship between production and social reproduction) and issues of equity (social cohesion/inclusion/exclusion), incentives (competing ideas/logics), and efficiency (responsibility mix). As Neil Bradford argues, "national policies are overarching federal development strategies for achieving economic growth and social cohesion within the Canadian political community...they are rooted in ambitious intellectual constructs that frame choices for decisionmakers...they elaborate programmatic action plans that specify the public policy instruments to be directed towards the practical tasks of implementation (roles and responsibilities to be shared among actors and institutions)...and, most fundamentally, [they] present moral visions or public philosophies about the economic and social priorities of the nation and desirable forms of development." (Bradford, 1998: 3).

Snapshot #1: The Era of Consolidation (1870 – 1914)

The first burst of business-led reforming activities was fueled by an extended period of economic expansion, a protectionist outlook, the desire to maintain foreign investment (almost exclusively British), and to ensure uninterrupted processes of accumulation. These economic objectives, necessarily, depended upon a stable, reliable, and highly skilled but low-wage workforce that could be quickly and inexpensively reproduced (Weibe, 1967). To these ends, key business leaders - the titans of industry, manufacturing, finance, transportation, insurance and agriculture - who lived by a strict Victorian Protestant moral code of thrift, sobriety, and long hours of hard work and who drew inspiration from a sense of *noblesse oblige* inherited from the British aristocracy, provided what amounts to a vanguard for orienting the country's first national social policy outlook (Bliss, 1987; McKay, 2000). According to major business interests of the day, Canada's first national social experiment - derived from the concept of less eligibility and a division between deserving and undeserving poor inherited from England's Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 - would be swiftly achieved through extra-parliamentary institutional means (charity, church, and family) with discretionary power at the local level for determining the form, content and objectives of state relief (Melcher, 1974; Finkel, 2006). In this regard, business and social elites were concerned, primarily, with addressing three major social issues: 1) the inter-generational transmission of poverty due to the "want of industry, of thrift, of selfreliance"; 2) general "moral intemperance", especially drunkenness, prostitution and uncontrolled sexual urges, notably among the "fertile classes" (immigrants, racialized and ethnic groups) due to the lack of a "solid base" in the Church; and, 3) urban decay, particularly the deteriorating quality of life, social cohesion and community breakdown in big cities as a result of massive waves of migration, both foreign and domestic (Rutherford, 1984; Valverde, 1991:20). On the issues of generational poverty and moral turpitude, business leaders appeared quite united around a grand project of reform, which some argue was a thinly veiled effort to impose a patriarchal and Victorian notion of the middle-class family onto the lives of newcomers, historically disadvantaged and racialized groups and poor people (Holman, 2000: 150-160; Valverde, 2000: 33-40). By this is meant that business-led poor relief was guided specifically by considerations of expanding middle-class *virtues* (industry, temperance, and thrift), *aspirations* (acquisition of property and accumulation of assets) and *social relations* (women serving as unpaid homemakers and men taking-up paid workers) (Dror, 1995: 223-272). Some scholars refer to these reforms as muscular Christianity in the sense that, business leadership on social reform and, especially women's roles, conveyed on authorities the right to enter into the neighbourhoods and homes of the poor and deviant for purposes of: "prying into cupboards and kitchens" and "peering into the innermost selves of the poor, including their sexual desires" and "deterring" working-age males from "lolling about". (Strange, 1998: 255-309). Not surprisingly, business-led advocacy for a strict separation of private and public spheres had significant consequences for gender and economic relations. That is, where women were to be strengthened in their maternal roles, working-age men were to be strengthened in their attachment to waged labour (Ursel, 1992; Griffin-Cohen, 1988).

However, when it came to determining the proper solution to the problem of urban decay, especially the issue of social cohesion, business leaders appeared quite divided. Some business elites argued for the implementation of public control of transportation and utilities, universal provision of health, moral and education programs and other social justice initiatives (e.g., rehabilitation instead of incarceration) while others proposed an urban planning agenda that focused on spatial inclusion such as the development of parks and recreation. Still other business leaders were strongly committed to a law and order agenda, preferring increased policing and detaining or imprisoning vagrants, beggars, and petty thieves as the more ideal solution (Guest, 1985: 30-31).

For their part, federal and provincial governments were largely ambivalent about social reform, preferring to leave the issue of poverty and community breakdown to municipalities who in turn left it to the work of business leaders, philanthropists with strong "charitable impulses", and helped along by professionals, largely, middle-class female social workers (Valverde, 1975:

33-60). The lack of state intervention, particularly before the turn of the century, suited many in the business community very well. That is, business leaders were strongly against giving money to the poor – the federal government's preferred solution - thus, responsibilities for poor relief and urban renewal were often blurred between families, municipal governments, and private charity (Holman, 2000: 159).

Nonetheless, business-led social reforms, undertaken primarily as an adjunct to the wider project of economic consolidation, and government indifference resulted not in compliance among the poor and dispossessed but intense resentment and widespread protest, resistance, work stoppages, and civil unrest (McKay, 2005: 145-154). Under extreme pressure from organized workers, the women's movement, and children's rights advocates over poor work and living conditions and, especially, the lack of a social minima (liveable wages and adequate income supports), the Canadian government changed course and intervened in business – labour - community relations (McKay, 2008). Although it would be an overstatement to think of business interests during the era of the First National Policy as monolithic (one need only to recall how bitter divisions within the business community over reciprocity during the 1911 federal election brought an end to almost two decades of Liberal governing), according to Easterbrook and Aitken, government intervention signalled a major turning point in Canada's business social history. That is, in the decade prior to the First World War, business had become significantly fractured not only by region, size, sector, and structure, but also by considerable growth in manufacturing jobs which provided a majority with middle-class lifestyles. In other words, with the support of government, the punitive and patriarchal Victorian vision of society was being swept into the dustbin of history as more and more Canadians became accustomed to a higher standard of living through improved wages, work conditions, and access to jobs, education and modest health care and work-related benefits (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956).

Snapshot #2: The Era of Contradictions (1914 – 1940)

In contrast with the First National Policy period, the interwar years appear indeterminate in the history of business and social reform. Generally, the lack of a coherent and overarching sense of what the emerging welfare state should look like or what it should do in relation to business' economic objectives was a result of an unstable balance between pressures for government inactivity and intervention. More specifically, this period was dominated by economic recession and, eventually, near collapse. The news of the day recorded details of the greatest gap between rich and poor, the highest levels of unemployment, deepest rates of poverty, and the most violent civic unrest in Canadian history (Guest, 1985: 48-63). In other words, it was an era of heightened contradictions which led many business, community and government leaders in search of a new National Policy for economic growth and social harmony.

This search, as suggested above, was driven through with tensions and conflict over competing social visions. For example, grassroots community forces, the rise of oppositional social gospel, farmer, and socialist parties and organizations, and organized labour were divided over the form, content, and, most especially, the pace of change (incremental vs. transformative), and thus were unable to connect their war efforts to demands for more extensive universal social reforms. Likewise, business leaders, many still compelled by financial orthodoxy and the long shadow of Victorian social order for increased privatization, less market regulation, and limited or no social benefits against those business leaders who proposed targeted reforms and more generous income supports, were unable to translate their policy preferences into government action (Weibe, 1962). The result was an incoherent dual socio-economic structure. For example, in terms of social legislation, a number of federal and provincial policies took on an (albeit limited) early social democratic outlook (socializing risk) including Mother's (1916) and Veteran's (1927) allowances, minimum wages (c. 1919), Old Age Assistance (1927) and social housing supports (1930) (Strong-Boag, 1995: 122-136). However, the objective of these social protections was not to liberate people from the market or to free women from unpaid domestic labour, but to encourage private industry (e.g., to build affordable housing), strengthen a patriarchal social order, and to help people acquire and build personal assets (save for hard times) (Guest, 1985). In regards to economic regulation, corporate and personal income taxes were decreased through-out the 1920s, antitrust laws were weakened and unenforced, and collusion between big business and politicians (especially in construction, transportation, railways and finance) went unchecked (Perkins, 1989: 241-251).

As the country was drawn into the economic downturn of the 1930s, this dual structure, or lack of policy coherence between social and economic spheres, created a deep chasm in the business community. According to Robert Wiebe, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 caused major business interests to become further fragmented over competing visions of "society characterized by an indeterminate process and a society of predictable motions under natural law." That is, business leaders were deeply divided between a political economy determined by collective social needs or driven by supply and demand (Weibe, 1962).

This chasm was most visible between those businesses which instituted company welfare programs, such as sickness insurance, pensions, mortgage loans, recreational programs and who supported or led campaigns for more universal social reforms like the institution of a federal Employment and Social Insurance scheme; and, those business leaders who rejected such interference in the market as undermining work incentive and competitiveness – the individual's natural drive to move-up in life – and who actively resisted community-led social reform activities (Finkel, 1979; Nerbas, 2013). By the mid-1930s, these divisions and struggles drew the federal government into a “realm of contested needs never before imagined by policy-makers” (Struthers, 1994: 77). That is, the economic tensions embedded in the First National Policy between domestic and international capitalism (protectionism vs. reciprocity) and the limitations of the 19th century social experiment based on mid-Victorian values, had been exposed. By the end of the Great Depression, business, community and government leaders began to envision a new era in Canadian economic and social development that would be quite different from the First National Policy order (Bradford, 1998: 24).

Snapshot #3: The Era of Consensus (1940 – 1975)

Between 1940 and 1975, Canada underwent a Keynesian revolution. For nearly four decades, a unique system of mixed-economic management (private and public ownership), labour market regulation, and power-sharing developed between business, community groups, organized labour and various levels of government. This arrangement centred on three key principles: demandside social policy making aimed at universal coverage based on citizenship; an interventionist role for government; and, consensus-building between stakeholders (particularly business and organized labour), which would serve as the fulcrum upon which the entire system would rest (Guest, 1987: 205-221). That is, the basis of this new power-sharing arrangement would be a “bond of trust” (consensus) between business, community, and government leaders (Collins, 1976: 5-9).

During this era, a tide of social, political, and economic reforms swept across the country. Pressure from the national Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) socialist party and subsequent Social Democratic (NDP) parties, a steep incline in militant and organized labour membership and a burgeoning women's movement - fresh off a successful campaign for a Family Allowance paid in cash on a monthly basis to mothers – along with numerous grassroots human rights and anti-poverty groups, drove the development of a Second National Policy and forced development of Canada's first nation-wide comprehensive welfare state (Moscovitch and Alpert, 1987; Finkel, 1997; Bradford, 1998). In this manner, between 1940 and the mid-1970s, Canada's Second National Policy was shaped and reshaped by numerous enquiries, multiple revisions to income security acts, the introduction of a federal cost-sharing plan for provincial social welfare programs, numerous White Papers (formal presentation of government policy positions) and Green Papers (policy proposals), and two major federal initiatives on poverty.[viii] This was also a period of significant evolution of Canadian federalism. That is, before 1940 provincial and federal governments were relatively independent. After WWII, due in part to the Rowell-Sirois Commission (1937-1940) – Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations - they became significantly more intertwined, particularly in the area of finance; namely, taxation agreements, conditional and block grants and equalization payments.[ix] For example, although the Rowell-Sirois Report discouraged shared-cost programs, federal and provincial governments entered into joint development of the welfare state through shared-cost social agreements related to post-secondary education (1952), hospital insurance (1957), the Canada Assistance Plan (1966), and medical insurance (1968). With the exception of education, the other three social programmes were cost-shared using a formula based, approximately, on the federal government providing 50 percent of such expenditures. However, federal social welfare block grants to the provinces held certain conditions; including, that social programmes be: comprehensive, universal, portable, accessible, and publicly administered (Guest, 1997: 103-153). The result of these changes was the near erasure of the 19th century division between deserving and undeserving poor and the stigma attached to recipients of state transfers. There was, as well, an impressive expansion of social protection, including, as suggested above: Unemployment Insurance, hospital and medical care, social programs for people with disabilities, Old Age Pensions and retirement insurance provisions, and comprehensive family income maintenance schemes (Rice and Prince, 2003: 55-82). However, for many women, Indigenous Peoples, visible minorities, ethnic and racialized groups, and newcomers, paradise was postponed (Briggs, 2001). That is, for many, access to the new Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) would be delayed for years and in the case of Indigenous Peoples, several decades. Further, the prevailing gender order, based on the Victorian male-breadwinner/femalehomemaker model, remained intact. This meant that women's unpaid work in the home continued to be unsupported by state programs (i.e., at the outset, home workers were not eligible for pensions or unemployment benefits) and social reproduction continued to be considered separate from the productive sphere. As well, public childcare and social housing was inadequate; income supports and allowances for loan mothers were far below the poverty line; campaigns to ensure women's body autonomy had not yet entered the legal arena; and, wages for women and other minority and racialized groups were considerably below men's average weekly earnings. Likewise, job opportunities and career mobility for most women were limited and usually restricted to caring professions (e.g., teaching, nursing, and secretarial positions) (Armstrong and Armstrong, 2010). The Victorian social hierarchy was especially visible in the political arena. Women were severely underrepresented in electoral politics, unsupported as candidates, and looked past for political internships and apprenticeships (Brodie, 1985).

Alvin Finkel proposes that a fragmented business community was the primary reason for the extended presence of the pre-war family system and classical liberal political economy across the post- war social liberal / social democratic Keynesian welfare period. According to Finkel, major business interests such as media conglomerates, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade, major retail, hotel, food services, insurance, manufacturing, and industrial associations, which had been divided prior to the war, were never completely united during the Era of Consensus. By this Finkel means that many business leaders only acquiesced to government intervention because they feared the CCF/NDP (socialist/social democratic parties) and their program of nationalization of industry and links to organized labour and the turbulent women's movement demanding greater equality in the labour market and in the home. However, most of business' public support for government intervention and state social insurance programs, services, and benefits was "always with the proviso that they must be funded on an actuarial basis so that they did not result in a massive transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor." (Finkel, 2006: 138-140) In this regard, major business interests sought to control the process of reform and to make clear that they were unprepared to pay for the costs of a comprehensive program of social security.

Snapshot #4: The Era of Knowledge and Information (1975-2017)

Foremost among the challenges facing Canada's post-war welfare state was the problem of reduced rates of economic growth following the global recession of 1974 and the associated problem of high levels of inflation. Keynesianism had assumed there to be an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation and many policymakers were, therefore, illequipped to deal with their simultaneous occurrence - a phenomenon known as stagflation (Hall, 1989). While virtually all Canadian governments, to a lesser or greater extent, attempted to restrain the growth of spending on social programmes, many governments did not immediately abandon the tenets of the Keynesian Welfare State. Instead, a number of governments experimented with a variety of "Keynesian-like" measures over a ten year period in an attempt to sustain the post-war settlement through what was widely thought to be merely a temporary departure from the path of continuous growth (Finkel, 2006). For example, between the late 1970s and late 1980s, governments in Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland continued to develop universal social programs, expand progressive tax policies and deliver modest demand-side budgets (Johnson, McBride, Smith, 1994).

However, major Canadian business interests and leaders like Gerald Bouey, Governor of the Bank of Canada (1973-1987), Judith Maxwell, Director of the Economic Council of Canada (1985-1993), the Conference Board of Canada, the Business Council on National Issues and the C.D. Howe Institute along with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, the Manitoba Conservative Government of Sterling Lyon (1977-1981), and the B.C. Social Credit Government of Bill Bennett (1983 – 1986) were not convinced. They did not agree that Canadians were experiencing a temporary departure from the status quo. Rather, they argued that Canada was transitioning to a new post-industrial global economic order and that the KWS was antithetical to such a system (Robson, 1976: 36-37). Consequently, in 1975 when Bank of Canada Governor, Gerald Bouey, announced that the Bank would maintain low inflation through the application of a restrictive monetary policy involving the setting of annual limits on the growth of the money supply – effectively rejecting Keynesianism – many business leaders recognized a crucial opening to exert a stronger and more direct influence on the design, trajectory and management of Canada’s post-war welfare state (Richards, 1997).

By the end of the 1970s, some have suggested that a vanguard of business social reformers was discernible (McKay, 2000). Their objective: using domestic social policy – the welfare state

- as a tool to improve the country's commercial competitiveness in a global free-market economy (Wolfe, 1984). This social reform vanguard was comprised of business leaders from the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors (e.g., Canadian Chemical Producers' Association and Canadian Liquid Air Association); real estate, retail and service sectors (e.g., Retail Council of Canada, Retail Merchants' Association of Canada, Canadian Association of Real Estate Boards, and Consumers' Association of Canada); forestry (e.g., Canadian Pulp and Paper Association), manufacturing (e.g., Canadian Manufacturers' Association), and extraction industries such as oil and gas in Alberta, gold mining in Ontario, potash mining in Saskatchewan, and iron and copper mining in Quebec (Stanbury, 1975). Business leaders with the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), the Economic Council of Canada, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and leading Boards of Trade were especially prominent members of the vanguard. However, some have argued that it was the national finance sector; namely, the CEOs of RBC Dominion Securities, TD Securities, and Scotia Capital, Inc., who were the *de facto* leaders of this new concentration of major business interests seeking fundamental transformation of the Canadian welfare state (Carroll, 2004; Carroll, 2010).

It is important to note that the rise of a business social reform vanguard, and neo-liberal business agenda more generally, was greatly aided by the strategic activities of New Right policy institutes or think tanks and the corporate media (Smith, 1991; Tupper, 1993; Linquist, 1993). The most influential business think tanks to emerge in Canada during this period, included: the Business Council on National Issues (1976) renamed the Canadian Council of Chief Executives in 2001; the C.D. Howe Institute (although the origins of the Institute go back to 1958, it did not take on a significant free-market advocacy role until the end of the 1970s); the Fraser Institute (1974); the Canada West Foundation (1970); and, the Conference Board of Canada (formed in

1954, the Conference Board adopted a distinctly activist profile in the mid-1970s) (Abelson, 2009: 92-126). Business media (e.g., Quebecor, Rogers Communication, Canwest Global Communications, Bell Globemedia, and Shaw Communications) actively popularized New Right dogmas (Brownlee, 2005). For example, The Globe and Mail's influential business commentator William Mackness repeatedly warned that "Canada's profligate social spending presents a tremendous moral hazard." Likewise, the Financial Post regularly proclaimed that, "Canadians have become spoiled, thanks to spendthrift politicians at all levels of government and with all parties." (McQuaig, 1993: 14). According to many within this growing neo-liberal hegemonic policy bloc (Carroll and Shaw, 2001), two problems required immediate attention. First, socalled "Opportunistic Keynesianism" – the piecemeal social programmes and services put in place before 1945, significantly extended in the ensuing decades and championed by sociallyoriented liberals, the Parti Quebecois and the NDP – was too costly, too disorganized and did not reflect the labour market needs of an emerging post-industrial global economic order (Richards, 1997: 64-65). Second, the demands of wage-fixing institutions (unions) for annual increases in the standard of living exceeded output (Meade, 1982: 20).

Paying particular attention to middle-class rate payers, who were feeling more and more squeezed by the high cost of living and less and less able to sustain welfare state expansion (Harell, Soroka, Mahon, 2008: 53-56), Canada's vanguard of business social reformers appealed to public opinion and policymakers for a complete rethinking of KWS principles on the following grounds: that rising government debt; an increased burden on social programs due to recessions; changing demographics and the breakdown of stabilizing institutions such as the church and two-parent families; an unwieldy and costly public service sector; a steep decline in willingness of citizens to pay higher taxes required to support government spending on universal social protection; and, the failure of the Keynesian welfare state to promote a strong work ethic, to create a mobile labour force, or to reflect the social policy needs of emerging city-regions, required that all levels of Canadian government “separate the welfare state from explicit socialist claims for the benefits of state economic planning over private market behaviour.” (Richards, 1997:25).

The vanguard’s attempt to redraw the boundaries between the market and society, that is to say, shift power from communities and public sector jobs to business and private sector jobs, was presented in terms of moving the country from a position of fiscal and moral chaos to one of fiscal and moral virtue (Richards, 1997). To this end, business elites framed their conception of a post-industrial social policy regime in terms that combined international economic and domestic social imperatives and went something like this: in order for Canada to compete in the global free-market economy, Canadians must transform the assumptions underpinning the country’s Keynesian welfare state from a moral hazard or “culture of dependency” into a high-minded “culture of human capital development” (96).

As a strong counter-measure to these perceived moral hazard dynamics, Canada’s business vanguard proposed that the post-industrial welfare state should be informed by the principles of integration, decentralization, human capital development, and making work pay - an elaborate euphemism for workfare (Courchene, 1995; Courchene and Stewart, 1992: 129). Specifically, the new welfare state should take the form of targeted benefits where government programmes emphasized investments in skills, training and knowledge-building with the objective of ensuring labour market mobility and securing a future return on investment. This would include, for example: early childhood intervention, supports for youth’s in transition from school-to-work and eliminating intergenerational poverty. In this regard, business leaders claimed that their blueprint for welfare state reform would eliminate social pathologies arising from long-term transfer dependence, reorganize a diverse patchwork of federal, provincial and territorial social policies into a coherent social union framework and reform labour market development strategies to prevent the depreciation or loss of skills from extended unemployment (Courchene, 1994; Courchene and Telmer, 1998). In essence, the aim of business' post-industrial welfare system was to increase workers' productivity, flexibility and mobility as well as responsiveness within the welfare state to new global productive forces and international division of labour (McBride, 1992; McBride, 2005).

Business' abandonment of the KWS and "active offensive" towards creating a market-driven social policy regime was met by resistance at all levels of government and across community organizations and sectors. At the federal level, for example, women's groups were arguably the most successful of the non-business organizations addressing income security policy changes during this period. It was through the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW) as well as a thick network of women's councils and policy offices that many leaders in the women's movement greatly increased their media exposure and made regular contact with key cabinet ministers in the spending ministries (Vickers, Rankin and Appelle, 1993). Women's groups focused national attention on social issues such as abortion, discriminatory pay, and children's day care. In political terms, pressure from women's groups contributed to amendments to the UI Act, increases in the GIS, and a broadening of the SPA that favoured the interests of women. Agitation from national women's groups and councils ensured that amendments to CPP were gender inclusive (Sharpe, 1994).

However, it was in the area of children's day care where women waged their most successful anti-business agenda struggles. In general, women supported a public or social democratic model of day care, based, at minimum, on the principles of universally available services, financial accessibility, and non-profit operation. An ad hoc coalition successfully lobbied the government to embrace a National Child Care Strategy. However, the social democratic principles favoured by many women's groups were profoundly at odds with a Conservative Government whose approach to child care was characterized by a preference for private enterprise, a commitment to parental choice and reluctance to impose national standards on provinces (Philips, 1989). Although, in the end, women's groups were unsuccessful in shaping the Conservative's child care bill, or stopping claw-backs and the tightening of UI, or the eventual termination of universal Family Allowances, they achieved a remarkable presence in parliament (as evidenced by the first ever televised leaders' debate on women's issues during the 1984 election) and did play an instrumental role in the Conservative's demise (Friendly, 1994).

At the provincial level, through-out most of the period in question, the province of Ontario was considered to be "offside" with Ottawa, "opposing the federal government's trade-led industrial policy and social policy restraint with an aggressive and somewhat interventionist package of economic and social policy renewal initiatives" where the primary objective was "strengthening the province's regional competitiveness in North America." (Graefe, 2003: 110115). More specifically, according to Robert MacDermid and Greg Albo, pro-business (neoliberal) social reforms were slowed considerably due to a Red Tory government that was "every bit as interventionist, possibly even more so, than the NDP government elected in 1990" followed by a Liberal government that continued to intervene in the economy and to expand social spending (McDermid and Albo, 2001: 174-175).

To elaborate briefly, in the first instance, the Davis Progressive Conservative government (1971-1985) brought in a guaranteed income programme for the elderly, a free drug prescription plan and purchased 25% of Suncor Oil Company. They also adopted a Provincial Income Supplementation that significantly increased the disposable income of the working poor and employable persons receiving social assistance[x] and implemented a range of employment policies which acted on demand-side interventions including job creation, wage subsidies and tax breaks for small businesses (McBride, 1987: 151-170). In the second instance, Liberal Premier David Peterson (1985-1990) established a multi-sector, multi-stakeholder processes to investigate the issues of poverty and social assistance. The social policy initiative was undertaken by a community-led Social Assistance Review Committee (SARC) Chaired by George Thomson. SARC produced the landmark *Transitions* report (1988) which called for a 4% increase in benefits, expansion of users' rights, enriched shelter subsidies, a relaxation of the spouse-in-the-house rule and an "opportunity planning" programme that offered a range of possibilities for encouraging the transition-to-work beyond integration into waged work (SARC, 1988).

Nonetheless, business' hostile attitudes towards the Keynesian welfare state soon found a champion at the provincial level. That is, Ontario's "New Conservative" Premier, Mike Harris, elected on June 8, 1995, responded enthusiastically to the economic and social policy preferences of major business interests. Harris unilaterally rolled-back the social state, most notably in the areas of education, social housing, childcare, public transit and infrastructure, trade unions and wages (Costolgou, 1996). He undertook major tax reforms including cuts of 30% off the existing marginal rate to bring Ontario to the lowest rates of income tax in the country at 45.5%. In a process known as disentanglement, Harris reformed the roles and responsibilities of municipal and provincial governments. Full costs for social housing, public transit, water, sewers, some highways as well as responsibility for social assistance were downloaded to municipalities. Prior to Harris, short-term cases under the General Welfare program were cost shared with municipalities 80/20 and Family Benefits Assistance for long-term cases were fully funded and administered by the province. As a consequence of devolution, municipalities' General Welfare obligations rose from 20% to 40% and from zero to 50% for Family Benefits programs. Administration of both programs were merged and entirely the responsibility of the municipality (Moscovitch, 1997).

In 1996, Harris cut social welfare benefit rates by 21.6%, intensified prosecution against welfare fraud, tightened eligibility rules which included the addition of new restrictions on cohabitation (e.g. a single person on assistance living with any person of the opposite sex, regardless of the nature of that relationship, would have allowance and shelter benefits lowered), heavy penalties were levied for quitting a job without just cause or for being fired, the wait period for benefits was lengthened from one to three months, and 16 and 17 year olds were permitted benefits only if they were in school or job training (Sabatini,1996: 173). Further to these changes, in 1998 Harris merged the old General Welfare Act and Family Benefits Act into the new *Ontario Works Act*. The core feature of this legislation was a workfare-learnfare program in which those on social assistance deemed employable would be required "either to work, or to be retrained in return for their benefits." (OPC, 1995, 1995: 10-11). That is, welfare recipients would be obligated to work for their cheques (excluding disabled persons, seniors and single parents with children under the age of three). Harris argued that work placement (as opposed to job search or job training) was the more efficient pathway to "breaking the cycle of dependency (MCSS, 1997: 14-20).

Most surprisingly, business did not buy into workfare at all. Despite being offered up to $1200 per placement, businesses refused to provide work placements for welfare recipients, in part, because they believed that job training was the role of government, but mostly because they had become generally disinterested in Harris' social reforms (Quaid, 2002: 172-176). In this regard, local business leaders appeared reluctant to confront widespread strike action and public agitation such as Days of Action (eleven days of province-wide protests against the Harris government) (Camfield, 2000).

Municipalities, also, were strongly unified in "waging a rearguard battle against Ontario Works" over devolution and merging of General Welfare and Family Benefits programs (Quaid, 2002: 182). There were many explosive battles, especially between the City of Toronto and Queen's Park, over implementing punitive and degrading anti-poverty policies. Municipalities were vigorously supported in their challenge to the Harris government by a procession of public protests and work disruptions led by community-based anti-poverty and social welfare groups (Ralph, Reginald and St. Amand, 1997: 143). In the end, workfare failed to take root and by the end of the 1990s was abandoned altogether.

At the beginning of the new millennium, business had begun, once again, to change its attitudes towards social reform. This change was driven, largely, by a substantial increase in poverty and inequality, especially notable in large urban centres (Hudson, 2016). In Toronto, for example, 23.3% of residents lived below the Low-Income Cut-Off (LICO), more than double the provincial average of 11.3%. Newcomers to the City experienced the highest rates of poverty at 35.8%. In fewer than ten years (1995-2003), the number of individuals living in poverty had increased by 5.3% and the number of families living in poverty had increased by 36.1%. Nearly

1 in 5 two-parent families were low-income compared with 1 in 10 in the rest of the province. More than 50% of lone-parent families were identified as low-income and poverty among children and youths reached a post-war high of 32.3% (United Way of Greater Toronto, 2007).

The labour market had also transformed in uneven ways during this period. Within a decade (1990-2000), the rate of precarious work had increased from 28% to 34% of the employed workforce. Women, immigrants and racialized groups earned, on average, $5.00 less per hour than their white-male counterparts (Vosko, 2000). In Ontario, the minimum wage had been frozen for eight years (1995- 2003) at $6.85. About 5% of Toronto's working population or 223,000 workers were earning at or below minimum wage (Battle, 2003). The after-tax median family income in Toronto had increased by a meager 1% and a gap of $251,474.00 had opened between the bottom 10% and top 10% incomes - the widest in the country. Racialized groups had after-tax incomes on average 20% less than their non-racialized counterparts. This income gap was accentuated for seniors, women (especially racialized women), persons with disabilities and Aboriginals (Block and Galabuzzi, 2011).

During this period, uneven social and labour market development were manifested in a new geography of poverty. Toronto's poorest had become concentrated in a circle around the prosperous urban core beginning at Jane and Finch, down through the former City of York to the Parkdale-High Park community, across to Alexander Park, Regent Park, Moss Park, and into parts of Scarborough. By 2001, over 54% of poor families were concentrated in these neighbourhoods (United Way of Greater Toronto, 2004). Housing and food insecurity in these communities were widespread. Wait lists for social housing had swelled to over 150,000, with average wait-times reaching an unprecedented high of eight years. Food bank usage swelled to over one million visits per year (Shapcott, 2003; OAFB, 2005).

Many City of Toronto business leaders and organizations were paying close attention to Toronto's place in the world and the ability of regional businesses to survive and compete in a global economy. To this end, Mayor Mel Lastman presided over the first Toronto City Summit Conference (June 25-26, 2002) convened at the University of Toronto's Rothman's School of Management. During the official media gathering to launch the conference, Lastman stated that, "Canadian cities are in a crisis -- and while no one is expecting all of the challenges we face to be resolved over the next seven days, City Summit will make the challenges clear and give us a forum to explore solutions...[p]erhaps most important of all, City Summit will give us a map of where we need to be in the future - and the framework of a plan to get us there."[xi] Joined by City Summit co-chairs John Tory (CEO of Rogers Cable), Frances Lankin (CEO of the United Way of Greater Toronto), Elyse Allan (CEO of the Toronto Board of Trade) and David Crombie

(former Mayor and CEO of the Canadian Urban Institute), John Tory added, "[u]ltimately, the City Summit is about the citizens of Toronto and the future of Toronto. The City Summit is an exciting initiative in the life of our city. The Toronto City Summit will: provide an opportunity for City leaders to enhance and share their knowledge about the issues facing Toronto; assess where Toronto stands in vital areas, such as economic development, social equity, infrastructure and transportation; and work to shape the city's agenda for the next decade."[xii]

As a result of this initial Conference, business leaders released a series of reports advocating for re-expansion of the welfare state and greater government intervention in the lives of individuals and communities.[xiii] For example, the 2003 report: *Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region*, appealed for an increase in funding to community-based infrastructure and social service needs such as waterfront revitalization, stable funding for public libraries, recreation, emergency shelters and increased social investments in early childhood development, public childcare spaces and public education as well as better integration of immigrants into the labour market and an appeal for a renewed national discussion on income security to address the problems of poverty, income inequality and labour market changes (TCSA, 2003). In 2006, TCSA released its marquis report for social policy renewal: Modernizing Income Supports for Working Age Adults. Here, business leaders proposed an interconnected package of social policy reforms that would provide a basis for making work pay and lowering barriers to work. This included: universalizing and standardizing Employment Insurance (EI) coverage and benefits, adjusting the marginal effective tax rate downwards, creating new refundable tax credits, boosting the social wage (education, training, skills-building), increasing the allowable limits on liquid assets for those on social assistance who are employable and extending some non-cash benefits to people transitioning off welfare and into work (TCSA, 2006).

Out of this shift in business attitudes and new policy environment, a number of significant social reforms would emerge in Ontario during the next decade. These included: the first major increase in the minimum wage in almost ten years (2007); the development of a provincial poverty reduction strategy (2008); the creation of a Child Tax Credit (2008-2010); a comprehensive social service review (2012), a City of Toronto poverty reduction strategy (2015) and, more recently, a commitment to pilot test a basic income and discussion around implementing a living wage policy (2017) (Graefe, 2013). More generally, by 2017, the country's social policy and economic development landscape had, in many ways, undergone important efforts at social policy renewal, especially when compared with where this story began in the 1970s. However, a great deal more study is required in order to assess the potential long-term effects of business' rejection of the Keynesian welfare state, subsequent rejection of workfare and ongoing struggle to determine the form and content of a post-industrial social policy regime.

Discussion: Why does business change its attitudes towards social reform?

This paper began with the objective of constructing a narrative arc from a number of disparate threads (historical, social, political, institutional, ideational and economic) to help explain the changing attitudes of some business leaders towards the welfare state. The arc traces competing forces in their struggles over the development of the Canadian social welfare system and its unique form and content as a manifestation of cleavages between and within business, community and government sectors, climaxing in the almost total collapse of the Canadian welfare state in the mid-1990s and slow movement towards rebuilding a post-industrial social policy regime. Although much more of the story has yet to be told before a full analysis can be offered and firm conclusions drawn, there is a sense that some key business leaders changed their attitudes towards the welfare state because they recognized that severing the economic sphere from the social sphere has disastrous effects. Some corporate elites came to acknowledge that the social sphere is crucial to economic growth but also that without government intervention, society breakdowns and cities decay. Some business leaders and organizations accepted that governments have important roles to play in balancing social and economic activities.

It is also evident from the story told here that business leaders' interest in the Canadian welfare system ebbs and flows. At different points in history, business leaders seem to argue that the welfare state no longer aligns with the changing political economy and the reality of internationalizing or globalizing markets. There is also an uneven response over time whether or not to make immediate and wholesale change to the existing system or to take the approach of incremental, issue-based reforms that align within the existing policy framework and to focus specifically on those interconnected policies that directly impact the quality of the labour available to business. In terms of the broader vision of social relations driving business' changing attitudes, it often appears to derive from a social liberal notion of middle-class values. Many business leaders seem to argue that building social skills, encouraging work ethic and a sense of social responsibility and desire for self-improvement – a middle class lifestyle – offers the best chance of permanently escaping poverty. Tax credits, training, education and skillsbuilding are the measures that will support personal (upward) striving.

Clearly, business' shifting attitudes were often the result of considerable resistance and disruptive power by community stakeholders and in certain, albeit limited ways, by provincial and municipal governments. In particular, key community stakeholders often rejected business's efforts to roll-back benefit rates, services and programmes or to alter the redistribution of power and democratic processes in business's favour. In addition, many community activists were especially disruptive towards corporate elites when business failed to address the issues confronting the most marginalized populations including women (especially single mothers), older workers, disabled people, racialized groups and youths aging out of the state's care.

Conclusion

The main concern of this brief history of business and social reform in Canada has been to establish a basis for making the claim that business attitudes toward social reform, across time and place, is dynamic and changeable. More specifically, I propose that social policy analysis should proceed from a nuanced view of business participation in social reform. By this is meant that, business leaders have different ideas and feel sympathetic towards different societal interests and community groups at different times and in different contexts. That is, no generalizations can be made about the social policies that business leaders are likely to support.

It is, therefore, also important to investigate and describe the splits and rivalries that exist within and between business leaders that lead to change. This approach will offer new insights into what is distinctive about social policy change and what this change might mean for the future design and direction of the post-industrial liberal welfare state in Canada.

Put differently, the long perspective enables us to offer some reassessment of the history of business participation in social policy making. It will also help us to grapple with contemporary struggles over social reform where the future of the Canadian welfare state is uncertain. The issue of 'community' – social cohesion/inclusion/exclusion - and the quality of social relations continues to be a central political concern to many business leaders and organizations.

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Endnotes

[i] William D. Coleman suggests that business interests in Canada are highly fragmented due to competing layers (sectors) of many small, narrowly (local and regionally) focused organizations who lobby for their own policies (grants, subsidies, tax cuts and so on) superimposed upon by larger peak organizations such as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Federation of Independent Business. To this end, Coleman suggests that more study of local/sub-national business leaders in the post-industrial era needs to be undertaken. See, William D. Coleman, "One Step Ahead: Business in the Policy Process in Canada," in Mark Charlton and Paul Barker, eds., *Crosscurrents: Contemporary Political Issues*, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1994), p. 340. See Craig Heron, "Harold, Marg, and the Boys: The Relevance of Class in Canadian History," in *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, Vol. 20, Issue 1 (2009): 1-26. A somewhat dated, but classic, sociological categorization of social relations and class in Canada is John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

[ii] This section draws heavily on Frances Fox-Piven, *Who's Afraid of Frances Fox Piven?: The Essential Writings of the Professor Glenn Beck Loves to Hate* (New York: New Press, 2011). See, Chapter 8: The Nature of Disruptive Power, pp. 207 – 226. [iii] Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 20-23. Some social policy analysts suggest that when the Latin rim countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain are added, a fourth 'Southern' world of welfare emerges. Further to this, some argue that countries within the Pacific Rim including Japan, South Korea, and Singapore also constitute a fourth world of welfare capitalism.
See, for example, Y-M Kim, "Welfare State or Safety Net? Development of the Social Welfare Policy of Kim Daejung Administration." *Korea Journal* 2001; 41 (2):169-201; and J. Bonoli, "Classifying welfare states: a twodimension approach", in *Journal of Social Policy* 1997 , 63 (2): 351- 372.

[iv] Breaking the term social policy into its components, here "policy" is taken "to refer to the principles that govern action directed towards given ends." This denotes "action about means as well as ends and it, therefore, implies change: changing situations, systems, practices, and behaviour." The term 'social' is somewhat more difficult to define because it is used in a variety of ways across many disciplines (e.g., social work, social planning, social anthropology, social geography, social administration, social law, social history, sociology and so forth). Given that, at its core, this is a history of political struggle – competing social forces, specific business leaders and those decisions which brought about change in the priorities and actions of Canadian governments, the term 'social' is used to mean an "instrument of change; an unpredictable, incalculable part of the whole political process."[iv] This does not necessarily mean that social policy is 'beneficient' - redistributing wealth and power from the rich to the poor or from the privileged to the disadvantaged. In other words, the term social policy does not refer to social altruism. See for example, Richard M. Titmuss, *Social Policy: An Introduction* Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss, eds., (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974). See, chapter two, "What is Social Policy?" pp. 23-32.

[v] Perhaps the most visible connection between business interests and gender relations has been in the policy areas of Employment Insurance and Maternity Benefits. See, for example, Martha MacDonald, "Income Security for Women: What about Employment Insurance?" in Marjorie Griffin Cohen and Jane Pulkingham, eds., *Public Policy for Women: The State, Income Security, and Labour Market Issues* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 251-271; and, Ann Porter, *Gendered States: Women, Unemployment Insurance, and the Political Economy of the Welfare State in Canada, 1945-1997*(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

[vi] Following O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, feminist is used in this study to describe "scholarship that uses gender as an analytic category and/or focus on the situation of women; feminist also describes political orientations in favour of (diverse versions of) gender equality." Julia S. O'Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver, *States, Markets, and Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 10.

[vii] See for example, Jane Jenson, Redesigning the "Welfare Mix" for Families: Policy Challenges. Discussion paper F/30 Canadian Policy Research Network, February, 2003; Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Democracy and the Welfare State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Janine Brodie,

ed., *Women and Canadian Public Policy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996); Patricia M. Evans and Gerda R. Wekerle, eds., *Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change* ((Toronto: University of Toronto Pess, 1997); Heather Maroney and Meg Luxton, "Gender at Work: Canadian Feminist Political Economy since 1988," in Wallace Clement, ed., *Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill -Queen's University Press, 1997); Dorothy E. Smith, *Writing the Social: Critique, Theory, and Investigations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 29-45; Wendy McKeen and Ann Porter, "Politics and Transformation: Welfare State Restructuring in Canada", in Wallace Clement and Leah F. Vosko, eds. *Changing Canada, Political Economy as Transformation* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), pp.109-134; Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau, *Who Cares? Women's Work, Childcare, and Welfare State Redesign* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); Marjorie Griffin Cohen and Jane Pulkingham, *Public Policy for Women, The State, Income Security, and Labour Market Issues* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); and, J. Pulkingham and R. Ternowetsky, eds. *Remaking Canadian social policy: social security in the late 1990s.* (Halifax: Fernwood, 2009). [viii] This includes for example: the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (1940); The Committee on
Health Insurance (the Heagerty Report, 1942); House of Commons Advisory Committee on Post-War Reconstruction Report (the Marsh Report, 1943); the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, Proposals of the Government of Canda (1945); revisions to the universal Old Age Security Act (1951); Old Age Assistance Act (1951); the Unemployment Assistance Act (1956); the federal Hospital Insurance Act (1956); the Royal Commission on Health Services (the Hall Commission, 1961); the Royal Commission on Taxation (1962); revisions to the Old Age Security Guaranteed Income Supplement program (1966); introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan (1966); Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty (the Croll Report, 1971); the Working Paper on Social Security in Canada (the Orange Book, 1973). In addition, there were revisions to the Indian Act (1969) and the creation of the Canadian Council on the Status of Women (1973). See, Neil Bradford, *Commissioning Ideas: Canadian National Policy Innovation in Comparative Perspective* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 2352; and, Allan Moscovitch, *The Welfare State in Canada: A Selected Bibliography, 1840-1978* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1983).

[ix] On recommendation by the Rowell-Sirois Report, in 1940 unemployment insurance was added to the list of federal of powers (previously it had belonged to the provinces). Later, in 1951 old age pensions were made a concurrent power (allowing the federal government into this area as well), and in 1964 the federal social welfare jurisdiction was enlarged to include widows' and survivors benefits and disability pensions. See, *Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Rowell-Sirois Report) (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1940).

[x] The Work Incentive Program (WIN) was implemented between 1979 and 1985. WIN provided an allowance based on family size and total earnings of the family (but did not include income such as Family Allowances, Child Tax Credit, and Ontario Tax Credits) and health related benefits for up to two years for recipients leaving the regular Family Benefits programme. Maximum allowances were reduced by $0.50 for each dollar of total family income above $675 (turning point). See, Gilles Seguin, "Descriptive Overview of Selected Provincial Income Supplementation and Work Incentive Initiatives," in Jacqueline S. Ismael, *The Canadian Welfare State: Evolution and Transition* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987), pp. 71-73.

[xi] Mayor Mel Lastman and co-chairs launch City Summit Week at the University of Toronto: http://wx.toronto.ca/inter/it/newsrel.nsf/9da959222128b9e885256618006646d3/52079e3f57228c7685256df60045f20a?OpenDocument [xii] Mayor Mel Lastman and co-chairs launch City Summit Week at the University of Toronto:
http://wx.toronto.ca/inter/it/newsrel.nsf/9da959222128b9e885256618006646d3/52079e3f57228c7685256df60045f20a?OpenDocument

[xiii] See for example, Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *Municipal Government in Canada, US and Europe* (2002); TD Bank Economics Special Report; *A Choice Between Investing in Canada's Cities or Divesting in Canada's Future* (2002); TD Bank and The Conference Board of Canada, *Addressing the Challenge: Deliberations at the TD Forum on Canada's Standard of Living* (November 2002); TD Bank Economics Special Report, *Affordable Housing in Canada: In Search of a New Paradigm* (June 2003); Toronto Financial Services Alliance, *Annual Report on Livability* (2003); Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *Quality of Life in Canadian*

Municipalities (2004);TD Economics Special Report, *Canada's Public Infrastructure Gap* (2004). It is important to also note that with regard to revenues (taxation) business leaders were largely mute or recommended increased taxation on consumption (as opposed to earnings, savings and investments) and better distribution of revenues as opposed to raising or implementing a progressive taxation regime.